State responsibility for the support of armed groups in the Commission of International Crimes

Under established principles of international law, State responsibility only arises where armed groups act under the direction or control of the State, or are completely dependent on the State. These tests are under inclusive as they do not consider the different ways States can exert control over armed groups in the commission of international crimes. This book analyses whether a reconfiguration of the tests of how direction and control or complete dependence are to be interpreted can pave the way forward for greater examination into the question of state responsibility in the support of armed groups in the commission of international crimes to be addressed. This book considers the subtle ways States can exert control over groups in the commission of crimes and advocates a widening of the scope of State responsibility through useful modifications to the interpretation of the tests of control and independence. This proposed widening of the current tests in international law, can dramatically impact on questions of state responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression, thereby expanding the net of responsibility far beyond its current pales.